In the early morning hours of January 3rd, 2026, the night skies over Caracas were flooded with military aircraft and lit up by airstrikes hitting critical military targets. The United States had begun a daring raid to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. The operation, designated Absolute Resolve, was the culmination of months of careful planning and preparation, involving the use of over 150 aircraft and the elite Delta Force special operations unit.1 Delta Force soldiers came in by helicopter, flying low towards Maduro’s heavily guarded safehouse. They had come prepared with months of knowledge on the president’s whereabouts from American spies and even trained with a replica of the safehouse. After successfully landing at the compound, Delta Force members captured and extracted President Maduro and his wife, suffering no fatalities during the raid. Maduro was taken to federal court in New York City, where he now stands trial for narco-terrorism and drug trafficking charges. Notably, the entire operation was conducted without the knowledge or approval of Congress.2
The seemingly unprovoked attack drew significant criticism both domestically and internationally for its apparent violations of international law and lack of oversight from Congressional authorities.3 While this action is certainly a significant new development in the geopolitics of Latin America, it still represents a continuation of the foreign policy that the United States has exerted on the region in decades prior. The capture of Maduro in Caracas is the latest event in a long history of American intervention in the region to combat the expanding influence of foreign powers and control the Western Hemisphere.
Historical Context
The Venezuelan government was largely pro-Western and open to international business during the latter half of the 20th century. A series of Venezuelan presidents pursued a policy of internationalization with Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A (PDVSA), the nation’s state-owned oil company, to encourage international investments in its growing oil industry. This situation changed with the election of Hugo Chavez and his socialist party in 1999, who began a significant shift in policy. The new constitution affirmed Venezuela’s state control over its hydrocarbon and mineral resources, along with restricting cooperation and ownership from international oil companies.4
Venezuela’s new government found ideological alignment and cooperation with neighboring states opposed to Western powers. Hugo Chavez’s foreign policy would focus on creating an alliance of ideologically aligned states in the Global South, with Venezuela taking on a leadership role. His vision also called for a new multipolar world where power was concentrated in multiple centers away from the Western world. After Chavez’s death, Nicolás Maduro was elected president in 2013 and chose to continue Chavez’s foreign policy of alignment with America’s rival powers, particularly with Russia and China.5 This fact, combined with Venezuela’s resource nationalism, made them a target of American foreign policy.
The United States and other Western-aligned nations have imposed extensive economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Venezuela, with Venezuela’s undemocratic electoral process and Maduro’s authoritarian grip on power being criticized by American officials. PDVSA has seen a significant decline in oil production as a result of the sanctions, dropping from 2.86 million barrels of oil per day in 2015 to a low of 0.66 per day in 2020. In response, Venezuela has turned to gold and potentially lithium mining as new sources of national income. However, the risks of nationalization of foreign assets, Venezuela’s weak enforcement of legal protections, and Western sanctions deter many international investors.6
The Trump Administration Sets Its Sights on Venezuela
While Venezuela realigned itself in opposition to the United States over the course of the 2000s and early 2010s, it was the first Trump administration that dramatically ramped up the rhetoric and coercive policies against the Venezuelan government. American officials came out in vocal support of the opposition party in Venezuela and contested the legitimacy of Maduro’s fraudulent election victory in 2018. Along with increasing sanctions against Venezuela’s oil industry, President Donald Trump also invited Venezuelan opposition leader Guaidó to his State of the Union speech in 2020. In addition, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo openly criticized China’s support of the Maduro regime, accusing them of deepening the crisis in the country.7
President Joe Biden’s interim term saw a softer approach, with some sanction relief and attempted negotiations. After Trump’s second victory in 2024, American foreign policy returned to an even more aggressive stance towards Venezuela. The Department of Defense's Southern Command began a military buildup with the stated goal of cracking down on narco-terrorism and drug trafficking into the United States. The State Department designated the Venezuelan Cartel De Los Soles as a foreign terrorist organization in November 2025, alleging that President Nicolás Maduro was its leader. During this time, American special forces were secretly preparing for their raid to capture Maduro in his safehouse and bring him to trial for these crimes on American soil. The surprise at the suddenness and boldness of the attack was quickly followed by widespread condemnation.8
Venezuelan allies, Russia and China, along with neighbors such as Colombia, were quick to condemn the attack for its illegality and destabilizing consequences.9 Congressional Democrats harbored a similar sentiment, arguing that the attack was unconstitutional without Congressional approval under the War Powers Act and that the Trump administration had lied about the operation.10 American military action is no stranger to accusations of violating international law. The United States has repeatedly created its own legal framework and justifications for military operations, with a particular tradition in Latin America.
Historical and Legal Precedent for American Intervention
The circumstances and justification for Maduro’s capture are most closely mirrored in the case of the arrest of Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega during the US invasion of 1989. A former US ally, Noriega’s relationship with the United States was soured by his antidemocratic rule of Panama and alleged drug trafficking offenses. The Bush administration of the late 80s sought to remove him under claims from the Justice Department that international criminals could be arrested without the consent of local authorities. Furthermore, the administration claimed that the operation against Noriega fell under the self-defense provisions of the UN charter, arguing that Noriega’s drug trafficking posed a threat to the US and that the democratic process itself needed protection. Despite this legal defense, the invasion was condemned by the UN and the international community.11 The American legal claims in Nicaragua are far from novel; historical and legal precedent for American interventionism in Latin America can be traced back to the Monroe Doctrine of the early 19th century.
The Monroe Doctrine, named after the American president in 1823, proclaimed American non-intervention in European affairs along with advocating against further European colonialism and intervention in the Western Hemisphere. It also gave the United States a sense of responsibility over Latin America, stating that any European intervention in the Americas would be perceived as a threat to the United States. As the United States expanded its territories and regional influence over the course of the 19th and late 20th centuries, the Monroe Doctrine was expanded into a broader justification of intervention.12 Secretary of State Richard Olney proclaimed in 1895 that “‘today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.’”13 An international debt crisis in Venezuela would further push the United States towards enforcing stability in Latin America.
By the turn of the 20th century, the Venezuelan government was unable to pay its foreign debts due to years of civil war and instability. The affected European powers, including the British Empire, Germany, and Italy, formed a blockade of the country from late 1902-1903. After an international arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of giving preferential treatment towards the European powers, Roosevelt became concerned that the enforcement of debt collection would become more common in the Western Hemisphere.14 He would respond by introducing the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904. The corollary emphasized the need for the United States to intervene in Latin America to prevent possible European colonialism and, most notably to act as a regional police force that maintains regional stability.15 As the 20th century progressed, it became clear that the United States would take military action, either directly or indirectly, against any rival power’s intervention in the region.
With the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union fully underway, the Soviets became involved with diplomatic support and shipments of arms to socialist governments in Latin America. Any Soviet posturing in the region was met in kind by the United States. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 may be the most significant example, where the United States nearly went to war with the Soviet Union over Soviet nuclear missiles being stationed just one hundred miles from Florida on Cuban soil.16 Another notable case is in the conflict between the Soviet-backed Sandinistas party and the American-backed rebel Contras in Nicaragua. President Reagan ordered the CIA to begin funding and arming the Contras after the fall of the American-backed regime in Nicaragua. These covert operations were done without the knowledge or oversight of Congress, leading to legislation such as the Defense Appropriations Act of 1983 and the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1984 attempting to prevent funding for military action in Nicaragua. In a similar fashion to the congressmen of today, Republican Senator Barry Goldwater criticized the president's foreign policy for its lack of transparency and breaches of international law.17 The influence and backing of Russia and China were present in Venezuela to a similar degree to that of the Soviets in Cuba and Nicaragua, necessitating an American response.
Sino-Russian Cooperation with Venezuela
In 2012, Venezuela’s deputy foreign minister, Temir Porras Porcelón, stated that it is a “‘necessity to construct a strategic relationship with one of the emergent or re‑emergent powers of the world.’” Russian foreign policy was in alignment with this sentiment, especially in regard to pushing back against American influence. Putin’s goals for Russia to restore its former prestige and importance as a major center for global power, while also preventing the spread of American influence around the world, could be facilitated through partnership with Venezuela.18
Russian Foreign Minister Primakov made a visit to Latin America in 1997, the first major tour since the end of the Soviet Union. Russia began to intensify its interests in Latin America in 2004 with an increase in arms sales to the region. Russian foreign policy sought cooperation with the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, an alliance of primarily socialist governments.19 Out of the various nations in the alliance, Venezuela emerged as the foremost Russian ally, receiving billions of dollars’ worth of arms, energy partnerships between PVDSA and Russian oil companies, and being granted debt for oil agreements to aid in recovery from an economic crisis. In 2025, the two nations joined in an initiative to work together as members of OPEC+ to stabilize energy markets.20
China also set its sights on building relations with Latin America, with its initial focus mostly on infrastructure development. Starting in 2005, China lent Latin American countries $74 billion over ten years for assistance with infrastructure and construction projects. In a meeting between Chinese officials and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in 2015, Xi Jinping proposed $35 billion be given out to fund infrastructure projects in the region.21 China’s capital inflows into the region provided an excellent opportunity for Venezuela to build relations with Beijing. Hugo Chavez created a strategic partnership with China through several visits and negotiations that saw a large flow of investments into the country. Venezuela was financed with $20 billion directly by the Chinese government in 2010, and their government was lent a further $62 billion by China over the course of Chavez’s time in office.
During Maduro’s presidency, China has continually provided diplomatic support and recognition for his legitimacy when it was challenged in the United Nations and United States. As Sino-Venezuelan relations deepened during the 2010s, Venezuela faced greater pressure from the United States, receiving both economic sanctions and questions of the legitimacy of its regime.22 Despite the pressure, the Chinese government has continued to provide economic aid to Venezuela through state-backed lending and letting Venezuelan oil be sold on the Chinese market to evade an American oil embargo. Maduro has responded in kind by affirming China’s claim over Taiwan and denying accusations of human rights abuses towards the Uyghur minority group.23 With Venezuela coming into alignment with Russia and China, the United States had the historical and past policy precedent to take decisive action on the Maduro regime.
Venezuela’s Uncertain Future and Conclusion
While Nicolás Maduro awaits trial, his regime remains in power, and the nation’s future is unclear. President Trump triumphantly declared in a press conference after the operation that American officials would assume control of Venezuela and improve the local oil infrastructure.24 However, it is unclear both what this kind of governance would look like and how feasible rebuilding Venezuela’s oil industry is given the years of decay it has faced.
The administration has outlined a basic 3-phase approach to restore democracy to Venezuela, but the timeline for elections and the establishment of a new government remains undefined. More importantly, the US has officially backed Delcy Rodriguez, Maduro’s vice president, as the next head of state, rather than supporting any leaders among the opposition. With Trump prioritizing stabilization of the flow of migrants, narcotics, and oil production as the goal for Venezuela, an authoritarian US-aligned Venezuela may be more feasible than restoring democracy. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent has already given support for easing sanctions on Venezuelan oil, signaling that the United States may intend to make the current regime into an ally.25
Regarding the Congressional reaction to the military operation, the legislative response has been ineffective. Five Republican senators broke with their party to advance the vote on a War Powers Resolution that would require congressional approval for any further military action in Venezuela. However, the resolution would ultimately be narrowly defeated through a tie-breaking vote by the Vice President.26 The failure of Congress to pass an act that limits executive discretion on military action is a departure from past successes after Vietnam and Nicaragua. Given the past and present successes of American intervention in the region, future US foreign policy will likely take similar actions against Latin American nations aligned with rival foreign powers, possibly without Congressional oversight. The international system is shifting towards competition between great powers such as China and the United States, with actions such as those in Venezuela inevitably becoming more common and necessary in the eyes of decision-makers.
Charles McPhail is a third-year undergraduate at Dickinson College studying Political Science and Quantitative Economics and a research intern at the United States Army War College - Strategic Studies Institute.
Notes:
1. Barnes, Julian E, Tyler Pager, and Eric Schmitt, “Inside ‘Operation Absolute Resolve,’ the U.S. Effort to Capture Maduro,” The New York Times, January 3, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/03/us/politics/trump-capture-maduro-venezuela.html.
2. Gareth Evans, “Spies, Drones and Blowtorches: How the US Captured Maduro,” BBC News, January 4, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdred61epg4o.
3. Monthly Forecast, “In Hindsight: The Security Council’s Muted Response to the Venezuela Crisis,” Security Council Report, February 1, 2026, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-02/in-hindsight-the-security-councils-muted-response-to-the-venezuela-crisis.php.
4. Antulio Rosales, “Pursuing Foreign Investment for Nationalist Goals: Venezuela's Hybrid Resource Nationalism," Business and Politics 20, no. 3 (September 2018), 438–64, https://doi.org/10.1017/bap.2018.11.
5. Alexandra Sitenko, “Latin American Vector in Russia’s Foreign Policy: Identities and Interests in the Russian-Venezuelan Partnership,” Politics in Central Europe 12, no. 1 (2016), 39–61, https://doi.org/10.1515/pce-2016-0003.
6. Nathaniel Ellis, “How Resource Nationalism Affects Investment in Venezuela,” Atlas Institute for International Affairs, March 17, 2025, https://atlasinstitute.org/how-resource-nationalism-affects-investment-in-venezuela/.
7. Matt Ferchen, China-Venezuela Relations in the Twenty-First Century: From Overconfidence to Uncertainty, United States Institute of Peace, 2020, 32.
8. Matthew Olay, “Trump Announces U.S. Military’s Capture of Maduro,” U.S. Department of War, January 3, 2026, https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4370431/trump-announces-us-militarys-capture-of-maduro/.
9. Monthly Forecast, “In Hindsight: The Security Council’s.”
10. Ed Pilkington, “‘They Lied to Our Face’: Democrats Decry Trump’s Military Raid on Venezuela,” The Guardian, January 4, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jan/04/democrats-trump-white-house-venezuela.
11. David Scheffer, “Maduro’s Capture and International Law: The Noriega Precedent,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 6, 2026, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/maduros-capture-and-international-law-noriega-precedent.
12. Juan Pablo Scarfi, “Denaturalizing the Monroe Doctrine: The Rise of Latin American Legal Anti-Imperialism in the Face of the Modern US and Hemispheric Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine,” Leiden Journal of International Law 33, no. 3 (2020), 541–55, https://doi.org/10.1017/S092215652000031X.
13. Matthias Maass, “Catalyst for the Roosevelt Corollary: Arbitrating the 1902-1903 Venezuela Crisis and Its Impact on the Development of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 20, no. 3 (2009), 383–402, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592290903293738.
14. Matthias Maass, “Catalyst for the Roosevelt Corollary,” 389.
15. Juan Pablo Scarfi, “Denaturalizing the Monroe Doctrine,” 547.
16. Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” October 14, 2022, https://armscontrolcenter.org/the-cuban-missile-crisis/.
17. “Portraits in Oversight: The Iran-Contra Affair,” Levin Center, n.d. https://levin-center.org/what-is-oversight/portraits/the-iran-contra-affair/https://levin-center.org/what-is-oversight/portraits/the-iran-contra-affair/.
18. Alexandra Sitenko, “Latin American Vector,” 51.
19. Ulf Thoene, Roberto García Alonso, Diego E. Dávila Benavides, Paula A. Roa Sánchez and Edgard Cuestas Zamora, “Russia in Latin America: Why support Venezuela in a crisis?” International Social Science Journal 73, no. 248 (June 2023), 630, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/issj.12423.
20. Gao Fei and Guo Xi, “Chinese Scholars See Russia’s Venezuela Strategy as a Model of Hybrid Power Projection in the U.S.’ Backyard,” The China Global South Project, November 3, 2025, https://chinaglobalsouth.com/2025/11/03/russia-venezuela-strategic-partnership-military-energy-diplomacy/.
21. Stephen Kaplan and Michael Penfold, “Making Inroads: Infrastructure, State Capacity, and Chinese Dominance in Latin American Development,” International Social Science Journal 73, no. 248 (2023), 116, https://doi.org/10.1111/issj.12424.
22. Phillip Brown, Rhoda Margesson, Rebecca M Nelson, and Clare Seelke, “Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations | Congress.Gov | Library of Congress,” Congress, December 6, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R44841.
23. Carlos Eduardo Piña, “China: A Silent Ally Protecting Venezuela’s Maduro,” The Diplomat, July 25, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/china-a-silent-ally-protecting-venezuelas-maduro/.
24. Barnes, Julian E, Tyler Pager, and Eric Schmitt, “Inside ‘Operation Absolute Resolve.’’’
25. John Polga-Hecimovich, “In Venezuela, the US Has Removed a Dictator, but Shows Little Sign of Building a Democracy,” London School of Economics, January 13, 2026, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2026/01/13/in-venezuela-the-us-has-removed-a-dictator-but-shows-little-sign-of-building-a-democracy/.
26. Jason Breslow, “Senate Republicans block Venezuela war powers resolution,” NPR News, January 14, 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/01/14/g-s1-106093/senate-war-powers-venezuela.
