Russia has a vast lead over the U.S. in nuclear forces in and around Europe and exploits it with frequent nuclear bullying. An overconfident Kremlin could miscalculate or think superiority might bring strategic advantage. At its June 24-25 summit in The Hague, NATO might weigh how to lessen the imbalance.
In intercontinental-range nuclear forces, the U.S. and Russia have rough parity, enshrined in the 2010 New START Treaty. But in 2023 Moscow suspended participation in it and ended inspections, heightening concerns about potential cheating.
More worrisome is the wide gap in U.S. and Russian nuclear arms with lesser ranges – theater-wide and shorter-range tactical weapons. As of 2023, according to the U.S. Department of State, Russia had 1,000-2,000 such weapons. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists estimates about 1,500.
These Russian arms include missiles, bombs, and other land- and sea-based weapons. Many are likely intended for use in and around Europe. By comparison, in Europe the U.S. has only about 100 air-delivered nuclear bombs. U.S. Navy surface combatants and attack submarines carry no nuclear arms, unlike their Russian counterparts.
According to secret Russian documents obtained by Financial Times, in the event of conflict with NATO Russia’s navy could strike deep inside Europe with nuclear-capable missiles. Last year, Putin needled Europe by saying it would be more or less defenseless against missiles. He also approved lowering Russia’s threshold for nuclear use.
In the Cold War, the U.S. and the USSR each had large numbers of theater and tactical nuclear arms. A potential nonnuclear conflict in Europe could have escalated into nuclear use. This risk may still be with us. Russia’s nuclear superiority in Europe and penchant for nuclear intimidation heighten dangers.
Arms control negotiations may not be promising. The imbalance in theater and tactical nuclear forces may be too great to enable the U.S. to secure equitable limits. Moreover, as in the pre-Gorbachev era, the hidebound security sector in Moscow may oppose intrusive inspections required to verify compliance with any new treaty. Russia’s ending New START inspections in 2023 is an ill omen.
Building up U.S. nuclear forces may be a better way to address the disparity. This was the route NATO took in 1979 to counter secret Soviet efforts to field a more powerful theater ballistic missile, the SS-20. While the U.S. had older nuclear forces in Europe, NATO decided it needed more capable missiles.
In 1979, NATO decided to put 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles in West Germany, and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in five member states. In 1983 despite shrill Soviet scare tactics, all five basing countries moved ahead to install the missiles. U.S. nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles were a possible alternative but were seen as insufficiently visible.
In 1987, the new missiles gave Washington leverage to reach agreement with Moscow on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It banned all theater missiles of this range. The treaty remained in effect for three decades. The U.S. withdrew in 2019 over Moscow’s secret deployment of a GLCM (9M729) that violated the Treaty. Meanwhile, Russia’s tactical nuclear arms have remained unconstrained.
Lessons from this experience might help inform current NATO decision-making.
The unanimity of the 1979 decision and the determination of the five basing countries to deploy missiles underlined to Moscow the strength of the alliance and its commitment to the nuclear mission. The deterrent effect of any new land-based missiles based in Europe today could also be seen by Moscow as a sign of NATO solidarity. The U.S. nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile now in development could also help.
Just as NATO sought to plug a possible gap in the spectrum of U.S. deterrent forces in Europe in 1979, any new U.S. nuclear missiles there might be most effective if they fill voids the Kremlin might perceive in NATO’s escalatory ladder.
NATO’s deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs offered a flexible array of fast-flying and slow-flying missiles suitable for holding at risk mobile as well as fixed targets. Any new NATO missiles might seek a similar strategic effect.
Bolstering NATO’s nuclear arsenal in and around Europe might be timely. The alliance’s nuclear posture may have lagged changes in the Russian threat.
William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at RAND and professor of policy analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy. In a career in the foreign service, he was deputy U.S. negotiator in U.S.-Soviet Defense and Space (missile defense) talks in Geneva and ambassador in negotiations there to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
