On February 28, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with U.S. President Donald Trump for an Oval Office discussion that many described as a train wreck. The meeting, a prelude to the signing of a minerals deal potentially valued at $500 Billion, resulted in a heated exchange between Zelenskyy, Trump, and U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance, with Zelenskyy ultimately exiting the White House, hat-in-hand. In the aftermath of the meeting even stalwart Ukraine advocates commented that Zelenskyy was “pushing and not taking the hint,” that he should be more deferential to Trump, and that “he did not read the room.”[1] The overall consensus among U.S. defense and strategy analysts is Zelenskyy alienated the U.S. and undercut his efforts to obtain security guarantees for Ukraine. The subsequent cutting of military aid and intelligence sharing underscored this opinion.

But what if President Zelenskyy hadn’t failed in his Oval Office meeting? What if he had in fact achieved his strategic goals to an overwhelming degree? President Zelenskyy walked out of the Oval Office and into the open arms of a European community ready to assist by whatever means necessary. In the wake of the failed meeting, the UK took up the mantle of leadership in advocating for Ukraine [2], the EU proposed $840 billion in defense spending[3], France floated the idea of extending its nuclear umbrella to the rest of Europe[4], and a number of nations opened their coffers and military stocks to Ukraine.  In spite of the brief pause in U.S. intelligence sharing shortly after the meeting, Ukraine has seen U.S. intelligence sharing and defense aid resume as well as a U.S.-backed initial ceasefire agreement proposed. All without signing over Ukraine’s mineral wealth or a direct apology.

Measuring the difference between the initial analysis of the Oval Office meeting and its aftermath is a matter of interpretation between failure and success, and it relies upon whether some of the foundational assumptions within the U.S. punditry hold true. It relies on the paternalistic view of Europe by the U.S. when it comes to defense issues. It relies on an apparent but unspoken belief that the leaders of other nations are not as skilled, intelligent, or as worthy of respect as U.S. Presidents. In short, it relies on the unshakeable truth that the United States is the indispensable nation, that no nation is truly secure without the U.S.

Unburdening ourselves of these assumptions allows a case to be made that Zelenskyy’s performance in the Oval Office was not only a strategic success but may very well have been his intended outcome. This case rests on three assertions. First, that President Zelenskyy was aware the U.S. under Trump was at best an unreliable ally and at worst a willing partner to Russia. Second, Europe is not nearly as weak as many make it out to be. Third, that Russia is not nearly as strong as it currently appears.

The first assertion is easy to demonstrate. As far back as 2019 the relationship between Zelenskyy and Trump was strained by the Hunter Biden scandal and their infamous phone call. It is reasonable to assume Zelenskyy understands that for Trump, the personal is the professional and that poor relations between he and Trump would spell difficulties in U.S.-Ukraine relations. This sentiment was further bolstered during Trump’s 2024 presidential campaign in which he criticized U.S. aid to Ukraine, and as early as September 2024 was conciliatory when speaking about Russia[5]. Trump’s re-election reinforced this rhetoric as surrogates and campaign officials were already laying the groundwork for Ukrainian territorial concessions[6]. Speculations that the Trump Administration would cut aid to Ukraine[7] proved correct when President Trump paused all foreign aid, including to Ukraine, shortly after taking office[8].

In retrospect it is hard to see how Zelenskyy could have been hopeful going into the Oval Office meeting. The most realistic outcome he faced was a mediocre meeting followed by a ceremonial deal signing; a result that would be an all-bark-and-no-bite strategy when it came to actually defending against Russia’s ongoing invasion. Yet Ukraine did not make any real concessions during the minerals deal negotiations, which could have been viewed as a last chance rapprochement. So, given the presumed lack of U.S. support, where would President Zelenskyy turn to achieve his strategic goals?

With the second assertion, that Europe is stronger than it might appear, it is important to understand its current military might. Fortunately, the past two weeks have been awash in European defense discussion. From podcasts to YouTube to written analysis, a majority of analysts believe Europe has the potential to be a military power but it will likely take years to achieve any real progress. These assessments are largely based on comparing the current state of European forces to the U.S., factoring in straight-line projections for defense industrial base development. What they miss are the readily available historic examples of rapid militarization.

In 1939, the United States had an army of around 200,000 active duty personnel, military equipment was limited and often obsolete, and “[w]ar-related industries were infinitesimal.”[9] Yet, two years later it entered the war with a fighting force of one and a half million and a defense industrial base that made America the “arsenal of democracy.”[10] Compare that starting point with Europe’s current force posture and it is hard to miss the potential. The transformation of the U.S. military prior to World War II was led by the inimitable Gen. George C. Marshall, and the U.S. was yet untouched by the conflict already raging in Europe and Asia. Similarly, Europe is largely untouched by the war in Ukraine. It has felt some economic pressures from the sanctions on Russia, mostly in the form of rising energy prices, but Europe has overcome those pressures by readily exploring options for improving energy security. While it took a visionary like Marshall to sort out the U.S. military, Europe doesn’t need similar figures to emerge. They can study doctrine and force analyses, pull out the best ideas, and move forward. Marshall struggled against opposition political headwinds within the U.S. These headwinds, however, are not only vanishing across Europe today but favorably shifting direction after Zelenskyy’s Oval Office meeting.

The third assertion, that Russia is weakening, has been another topic of great discussion in recent weeks. Some argue that Russia is capable of enduring for some time and given an immediate ceasefire it can regenerate its forces within a decade[11]. Others are more circumspect on the health of Russian military apparatus. Short term versus long term analysis of Russian military strength indicates that while it may be capable of fielding and arming a force in the short term, if a ceasefire is not agreed upon and the fighting continues it faces political, economic, and demographic problems ahead[12].

Once again drawing on historical precedent is valuable. After World War II, the Soviet Union was viewed as a permanent fixture on the global stage, until its unexpected collapse. A collapse that was preceded by the Soviet Union’s costly military operation in Afghanistan. The Afghan War resulted in an estimated 650,000 Russian casualties over the ten-year conflict[13]. This figure is already dwarfed by Russian losses over the course of its three-year war with Ukraine, currently an estimated 800,000 casualties. At this pace Russia stands to suffer 2.5 million casualties if the Ukraine war were to drag out as long as the Afghan war. Russia has not yet been forced to conscript from within its Western cities, but that is only a matter of time. A protracted conflict with an even slightly increased pace of economic and demographic losses is likely to destabilize an already fragile regime. While it is unwise to base strategic decisions on a mere possibility, one would be remiss to ignore the potential effects of a protracted Ukraine war.

In this light, Zelenskyy has every reason to believe that leveraging the staying power of an increasingly engaged Europe provides better leverage against Putin than the Trump Administration will. It is also reasonable to assume he understands it would take a dramatic shift in U.S. policy and behavior to push Europe toward a more aggressive defense posture. Since World War II, Europe has been happy to rely on the U.S. for security assurance. They did so fully understanding the U.S. was trading security guarantees for increased political and economic influence across Europe. Despite repeated signaling by Trump that he no longer considered those trade-offs worthwhile the Western world was content to imagine it was merely posturing, or a negotiation tactic to extract concessions on future requests, rather than a firm statement of future U.S. policy. It took a dramatic public incident, one in which Trump paid more deference to an alleged adversary than an ally, for many to finally recognize the sea change.

Although it is unlikely Zelenskyy planned for the Oval Office meeting to fail, it must be considered as a viable alternative. This opens the door to a further reassessment of the geostrategic environment in general. It is understandable why many in U.S. and Western defense and policy circles are hesitant about opening this Pandora’s Box: it’s a sign of diminishing U.S. influence on global affairs. It is another in a series of signs that the Western Liberal-Democratic order is in peril and it opens the door to a world refocused on the East. Those are not comfortable prospects as they herald massive disruptions to global economics, international relations, and the tenuous stability of the last 80 years. However, they are assessments that U.S. and Western analysts need to make in order to prepare for and potentially prevent the worst consequences of the current disruptions. Perhaps, like Zelenskyy, we need to have the courage to face down those challenges and push for better outcomes.

Aaron Beckman is a retired U.S. Army intelligence officer and military diplomat with multiple combat deployments. He served in a range of intelligence positions from the tactical to the strategic, culminating his military career as a defense attaché to the U.S. Embassies in Cairo, Egypt and Vienna, Austria.