Donald Trump's approach to Russia and Vladimir Putin has reignited the debate over whether his apparent coziness with Moscow is a strategic gambit to drive a wedge between Russia and China. Proponents of this theory suggest that Trump is playing a high-stakes version of Richard Nixon’s famous 1970s maneuver, when the United States successfully exploited the Sino-Soviet split to draw China closer to the Western alliance while further isolating the Soviet Union. But a closer look at today’s geopolitical landscape reveals a very different reality. Far from dividing Russia and China, Trump’s tactics in his second term risk splintering the Western alliance, undermining U.S. interests far more than weakening the Beijing-Moscow axis.
A recent piece in UnHerd argues that Trump might exploit structural tensions between Russia and China to achieve a Nixon-style split. This analysis points to historical and regional frictions – such as Russian unease over Chinese influence in Central Asia and competition in the Arctic – as evidence that the relationship is not as solid as it appears. However, this argument overlooks the broader strategic incentives that bind Moscow and Beijing together. Whatever the tactical disagreements, both powers share a common interest in resisting the U.S.-led international order and countering NATO’s influence.
While there are certainly points of friction between Moscow and Beijing – ranging from competition in Central Asia to China's growing economic influence in what Russia considers its sphere of influence – these are far outweighed by their shared strategic interests. Both nations see the U.S.-led Western alliance as the principal obstacle to their geopolitical ambitions. For Russia, this means undermining NATO and securing a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. For China, it involves countering U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific and asserting its dominance over Taiwan and the South China Sea.
The proponents of a “reverse Nixon” strategy misread history as well as the present. Unlike the 1970s, when the Soviet Union and China had recently fought a border war and sharply diverged ideologically, today's Russia and China maintain a pragmatic alignment. The “no limits” partnership between Beijing and Moscow, originally announced in early 2022, has only deepened, showing no signs of the kind of ideological or geopolitical fissures that the United States exploited in the 1970s.
Indeed, quite the opposite. On the Russian side, the Western efforts to isolate Moscow as a means of pressuring it to end its war against Ukraine have pushed it firmly into the embrace of China – and that is not likely to change even as the war winds down. And on the Chinese side, an under-appreciated factor sustaining the Russia-China entente is Beijing’s growing fear that it could find itself isolated by the West in much the same way the Soviet Union was in the 1980s – a trajectory that ultimately led to the collapse of the USSR. For China, maintaining a strong partnership with Russia is not just about countering U.S. influence but also about avoiding a scenario in which it stands isolated on the world stage.
It is this alignment of strategic imperatives that makes the Russia-China partnership so durable. While Moscow and Beijing may occasionally disagree on tactics or regional priorities, they both recognize that only by standing together can they hope to resist, if not challenge, the Western order. Trump’s belief – or at least the belief of those who advise him – that he can replicate a Nixonian maneuver to split these powers fundamentally misunderstands the nature of their relationship.
Meanwhile, Putin has managed to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its NATO allies. The signs are hard to ignore. Throughout the ongoing Ukraine war, Putin has exploited divisions within the alliance. From Hungary's Viktor Orbán blocking EU sanctions to Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan balancing arms deals and diplomacy, to Germany’s cautious energy policies, the cracks in the Western front are visible. These divisions are not solely a product of Putin’s actions, but he has deftly maneuvered to widen them. Trump's apparent affinity for Putin in his second term has only added to the uncertainty among U.S. allies about Washington's commitments.
During his second term, Trump’s approach to NATO has remained consistent with his first. His calls for European allies to increase their defense spending are not without merit, but they must be balanced with clear and unwavering support for the alliance. NATO solidarity remains crucial but so does rebalancing the burden-sharing within the alliance. The U.S. must find a way to reduce its disproportionate role in European security while ensuring that NATO remains a credible deterrent to Russian aggression.
To be clear, this does not mean Trump should give Putin the cold shoulder. Keeping open lines of communication between two great powers is both necessary and prudent. Dialogue can help manage tensions, avoid misunderstandings, and maintain stability. However, such communication should not be grounded in the delusion that Russia can be wooed away from China. The strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing is a reality that Washington must accept, not wish away.
A pragmatic strategic approach would involve the U.S. maintaining its leadership in NATO, avoiding the delusion that cozying up to Putin will split Russia and China, and instead focusing on ensuring that the European allies step up. This could allow the U.S. to reallocate military resources to regions where its strategic interests are most directly at stake – namely, the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific. The goal should not be to undermine NATO but to create a more balanced alliance where Europe takes on a greater share of the burden of securing Europe and the North Atlantic while the U.S. positions itself to address broader global threats.
Ultimately, Trump’s attempt to replay a Nixonian strategy with Russia and China fails to grasp the structural realities of today's multipolar world. Nixon succeeded because he identified and leveraged a genuine strategic opportunity between adversaries. Trump, by contrast, risks achieving the opposite – providing Russia with the leverage it needs to drive wedges between the U.S. and Europe. Instead of weakening the Russia-China axis, Trump’s approach may only weaken the transatlantic alliance that has been the bedrock of Western security since World War II.
The U.S. needs a grand strategy that acknowledges the durability of the Russia-China partnership and prioritizes the unity of the Western alliance. A pragmatic and restrained approach would focus on shoring up NATO, rebalancing burden-sharing within the alliance, and ensuring the U.S. can reallocate its military resources to the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific. Anything less risks turning a supposed “reverse Nixon maneuver” into a strategic blunder that would be the exact inverse of the strategic success of the original.
Andrew Latham, Ph.D., a tenured professor at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minnesota. He is also a Senior Washington Fellow with the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy in Ottawa and a non-resident fellow with Defense Priorities, a think tank in Washington, DC.
