Nuclear Deterrence Strategy and Nuclear Enterprise Reorganization at DoD in Trump 47
China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are dictating the current global threat environment. Unscrupulous actions such as espionage, cyber activity, intellectual property theft, aggression upon sovereign countries, and gray zone operations occur around the clock. These threats are well understood, but it is the nuclear weapons programs of each country that should most concern the American people. More to the point, the concern should be about America’s currently failing nuclear modernization and deterrence strategy. President Trump and his national security team have an opportunity to fix it and here are five recommendations.
First, extensive and unnecessary researching, reassessing, and rewriting a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) will bog down an already beleaguered process. President Trump’s 2018 NPR is sufficient for overall direction and prioritization. In lieu of a rewrite, the President-elect should consider publishing Nuclear Deterrence Strategy Guidance (NDSG) under a National Security Policy Memorandum (NSPM). This guidance would reestablish the 2018 NPR while also providing necessary updates to items such as the current strategic environment, nuclear enterprise modernization priorities, updated delivery timelines for certain strategic and non-strategic warheads, and scene setting for non-proliferation and arms control regimes.
Second, establish a Nuclear Deterrence Strategy (NDS) working group at the National Security Council consisting of the National Security Advisor, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. This would be a separate, permanent, and stand-alone Policy Coordination Committee (PCC). It should remain in place for the duration of the President’s term for accountability and oversight of modernization timelines that, heretofore, have been missed. A group of these four cabinet level officials can make time-critical decisions much more quickly while also cutting through DOE and EPA red tape and holding accountable the private sector companies executing much of this work. The NDS PCC should publish the aforementioned NDSG within 90 days of President Trump publishing the NSPM. Adversaries, allies, partners, and United States Government personnel (political, uniform, and career) must know that American under Trump 47 is serious about nuclear deterrence and modernization strategy.
Third, officially lay to rest the New START Treaty and pursue comprehensive tri-lateral arms control with China and Russia. In 2010, 13 Senate Republicans joined with 56 Democrats and 2 Independents to ratify New START. Compromise from the 13 GOP Senators was based largely on President Obama’s promise to modernize the nuclear arsenal. In the 15 years since Senate ratification, the United States has adhered to the treaty constraints of deployed nuclear warheads; however, we have not significantly modernized the arsenal per the GOP agreement to support New START. Much more troubling, during this period Russia, China, and the DPRK have all modernized their nuclear capabilities. Last month, Putin lowered Russia’s threshold for nuclear weapon use after the Biden Administration approved Ukrainian use of U.S. made ATACMS to strike targets inside Russia. Earlier this month, DoD publicly acknowledged that China will have more than 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030. While President Trump correctly sought a tri-lateral arms control agreement during his first administration, 2025 presents improved opportunities for these conversations. Russia is weakened by years of war and China’s economic and domestic issues continue to mount. The perfect opportunity has formed to capitalize upon President Trump’s position of global recognition and strength. Nobody wants a nuclear conflict. The Trump Administration is poised to have a lasting impact on global peace, stability, and American strength by securing a comprehensive tri-lateral arms control agreement.
Fourth, President Trump should separate nuclear modernization and enterprise funding from the defense budget. The Congressional appropriations and National Defense Authorization Act processes often last into the next fiscal year which presents challenges to DoD’s planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process. These delays negatively impact modernization and capability development. Nuclear deterrence should be bifurcated from the traditional defense authorization and appropriation process and be passed annually as its own legislation. After some initial must pass legislation related to taxes and border security, Congress has an opportunity to fast-track passage of the first of an annual National Nuclear Deterrence Act. This should occur before June and encompass all aspects of nuclear strategy to include - among other issues: nuclear triad modernization; nuclear weapon infrastructure improvements and upgrades; warhead production; low yield weapon development; nuclear event hardening of military assets; and nuclear event medical defense and response capability development. Modernization and development of nuclear deterrence capabilities is a priority, and it should be treated as such.
Fifth, DoD’s nuclear deterrence policy and programs enterprise should be reorganized. The FY25 NDAA includes a provision (section 1621) that establishes the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological Defense Policy and Programs. Within this new Assistant Secretary office should reside the following offices and organizations: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Chemical and Biological Defense Policy and Programs; DASD for Nuclear (and Radiological) Defense Policy and Programs; DASD for Threat Reduction and Arms Control Policy and Programs; and Director Defense Threat Reduction Agency. These DASD offices will all incorporate their respective policy areas from the DASD for Nuclear and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Policy currently residing in the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy.
The point of implementing these five recommendations is to prevent nuclear war, not to enable it. Right now, the global environment is heading down that path due in part to various and repeated nuclear escalation actions by China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. (And whatever is currently happening in Pakistan). These actions must have a resounding and immutable reaction from the United States. Unfortunately, it seems that we cannot count on our historical European allies to be counterweights. Accordingly, this must be done by prioritizing nuclear modernization and deterrence through new guidance, high-level and effective decision-making authority and oversight, increased funding and development, and reorganization of the DoD nuclear deterrence enterprise. Adversaries are negatively recalibrating the nuclear deterrence framework. President Trump and his national security team can reposition this in favor of the United States.
David F. Lasseter is the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering WMD during the Trump Administration, visiting fellow at the National Security Institute, and Founder of Horizons Global Solutions.
