Foreign policy analysts increasingly refer to the "axis of upheaval" to describe the growing cooperation among anti-Western powers—Russia, China, North Korea, and Iranian-backed groups. While much of the focus has been on the strategic partnership between Russia and China, the threat posed by Iranian-backed terrorist groups like the Houthis should not be overlooked. Multiple intelligence sources indicate that Iran is facilitating talks between the Houthi rebels and Russia to secure Russian P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missiles, significantly boosting the Houthis' capacity to target vessels in the Red Sea. The Houthis are also reportedly granting Chinese cargo ships safe passage, given China's strong diplomatic ties with Iran.
The Red Sea is a critical artery for global commerce. Yet the United States has largely failed to effectively address the growing Houthi threat. Responsible for 10-15% of global maritime trade, the Red Sea has seen a dramatic decline in container shipping—down over 90% since December 2023. Houthi attacks on vessels have forced companies to reroute ships around the southern tip of Africa, adding 1-2 weeks to travel times and increasing fuel costs by $1 million per trip. These disruptions have intensified pressure on already strained global supply chains, amplifying the economic impact on international trade. The U.S. must develop a clear policy toward the Red Sea to address this escalating crisis.
The Biden administration, however, lacks strategic clarity in its efforts to counter the Houthis. In December 2023, the United States launched Operation Prosperity Guardian with the support of 20 countries to protect commercial shipping from Houthi attacks by intercepting drones and missiles. However, the price of U.S. forces and technologies deployed in the Red Sea—such as interceptor missiles, Reaper drones, and precision-guided bombs—vastly outweighs the relatively low cost of the Houthis' disruptive drones. Washington loses tens of millions of dollars with each downed Reaper, while Houthi casualties remain minimal, and commercial vessels continue to face threats.
The Pentagon has requested $1 billion over the next two years to develop "cost-effective" solutions to drone warfare, with a focus on Replicator drone swarms. However, this crucial initiative would prove futile if the root cause of the problem remains unaddressed. U.S. policy thus far has been one of deliberate de-escalation, primarily focused on defending against Houthi attacks. Unfortunately, this strategy does not establish a clear end objective. Rather than eliminating the Houthi threat and securing freedom of navigation, the Biden administration seems to believe that continued downing of Houthi missiles will act as a deterrent, which has not been proven the case. The Biden administration’s approach risks leading to prolonged and costly engagements while remaining entangled in a conflict with the Houthis.
Instead, the United States should go on the offense against the Houthis by going after their command and control centers, logistical infrastructures, arms shipments, and drone production facilities. According to the U.S. Naval Institute, as of November 12, 2024, the United States has a guided missile destroyers and a guided missile submarine in the Red Sea . The USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group was also recently deployed, including the Carrier Air Wing 1 with nine aviation squadrons, one guided missile cruiser, and two guided missile destroyers. These forces would be most effectively employed by taking the initiative against the Houthis.
Without a shift to an offensive posture, the Houthi threat will persist. The group’s opposition to Western influence and its regional ambitions will continue to destabilize the area. Failure to decisively neutralize the Houthis would only allow them to regroup, signaling that their aggression successfully pressures the West. This could encourage further escalation, with the Houthis expecting that future confrontation will similarly weaken Western resolve.
In addition to adopting a more aggressive military posture, the United States should also take bold actions on other fronts. The United States should focus on disrupting Iran’s financial and logistical support that enables the Houthis' operations. This involves expanding targeted sanctions on Iran’s financial institutions and the IRGC and applying secondary sanctions to deter third-party entities from facilitating transactions that support the Houthis. These measures would increase the economic pressure on Iran, forcing it to reconsider the cost of its involvement in Yemen. Additionally, offensive cyber operations should play a key role in dismantling Iran’s informal financial networks, such as hawala systems and potential cryptocurrency channels that fund Houthi activities.
The U.S. should also continue to conduct cyberattacks against Iranian military assets and Houthis, as evidenced by recent cyber operations targeting an Iranian spy ship that was facilitating intelligence sharing with the Houthis. This strategic disruption is essential to curbing the Houthis' ability to target Red Sea vessels. Furthermore, as Russia and China are likely to increase their support for Iran’s defense industry--weakening U.S. defense capabilities while strengthening Iranian-backed militias--it is critical that the U.S. counters this dynamic. The U.S. should advocate for reforms within the United Nations' Verification and Inspection Mechanism to enhance oversight of goods entering Yemen and ensure stricter enforcement of sanctions.
Some may argue that the United States should not allocate significant resources to addressing the Houthis, given more urgent threats like the conflict in Ukraine and tensions with Russia. However, the Houthi threat warrants serious attention because the group undermines the principle of freedom of navigation, a cornerstone of global stability. Once this principle is compromised, it opens the door for other malicious actors to challenge it in critical regions. The U.S. must determine whether defending freedom of navigation is a priority, as neglecting it could lead to threats in strategic waterways such as the Suez Canal, Taiwan Strait, Lombok Strait, and Strait of Gibraltar. If the U.S. concludes that this principle is indeed worth defending, it must adopt a more assertive military posture against the Houthis and target their financial and logistical support from Iran.
