The Day after 10/7 and the Gaza War in Historical Perspective
There is a widespread notion that international conflicts are usually susceptible to peaceful resolution. If only the underlying causes of the conflict are addressed, with good will and perseverance, international conflicts can be solved peacefully. Unfortunately, that is not always the case.
There are many protracted, ongoing conflicts in the international system. For instance, Britain and Argentina are engaged in an international conflict over the Falklands-Malvinas Islands in the South Atlantic since 1833, and India and Pakistan are at loggerheads over the status of Kashmir since 1947.
In order for an international conflict to be solved peacefully, the two sides involved have to recognize the right to exist of the other. Certainly, mutual recognition is not a guarantee for solving an international conflict. Britain, and Argentina, as well as India and Pakistan, recognize each other, but are still involved in conflict. Rather, mutual recognition is a prerequisite for solving peacefully an international conflict.
Peace between Egypt and Israel, for example, became possible only after the Egyptians consented to recognize openly and explicitly Israel’s right to exist as a sovereign state in 1977. The ensuing negotiations revolved around boundaries, security measures and the delineation of a diplomatic framework to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
To be sure, prior to 1977, Egypt and Israel had reached two interim agreements in the wake of the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 thanks to the mediating efforts of the United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Thus, the conflict between Egypt and Israel moderated even before Egypt was ready to recognize Israel’s right to exist. In this context, one should distinguish between an explicit and an implicit recognition. By signing these two interim agreements, Egypt implicitly recognized Israel as a sovereign entity, but it did not recognize its right to exist as such. Only when Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, paid an official visit to Israel in November 1977, did he announce openly and explicitly that Egypt welcomed Israel as an integral part of the region with which it wished to live in peace. Official, de jure recognition occurred when a peace agreement was signed in Washington D.C. in March 1979.
Sometimes, two countries may recognize each other, have a conflict ostensibly about boundaries or minority rights, and yet one side may conceal its final objective to destroy the other side. For instance, Nazi Germany had a conflict with Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland, an area that was an integral part of the sovereign territory of Czechoslovakia, mostly inhabited by a German-speaking population. The conflict was transformed by Germany into an international crisis in 1938. In order to avert war, Britain and France agreed to cede the Sudetenland to Germany, hoping this would solve the crisis and end the conflict. As it turned out, the crisis was solved, but the conflict did not end. Germany’s aim went much beyond the Sudetenland. In March 1939, Germany invaded what remained of Czechoslovakia, thus putting an end to its sovereign, independent existence.
Germany’s objective did not change from 1938 to 1939, only the means to achieve it did.
Thus, international conflicts can be resolved not only if the two sides involved recognize each other, but if their respective objective does not entail the eventual destruction of the other.
The conflict between France and the Front de Liberation National (FLN) in Algeria, for instance, was finally settled in 1962 once French President Charles de Gaulle agreed to withdraw from Algeria and recognize an independent Algeria. Of course, he knew that the FLN’s objective was not to destroy France as a sovereign entity, but only to establish an independent state in Algeria. He realized that the conflict would be over once France withdrew from Algeria.
That is not the case with regard to Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. To begin with, the Palestinian Arabs are divided between the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. The Hamas and the Islamic Jihad call openly and explicitly for the destruction of Israel. The Palestinian Authority (PA) officially agrees to the so-called two-states solution. Indeed, the Oslo Accords of 1993, which led to the establishment of the PA, entail a mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). However, past rejections by the PA of proposals advanced by the U.S. and Israel to end the conflict without advancing concrete counter-proposals, its advocacy of the so-called right of return, which would imply the peaceful destruction of Israel as a Jewish state, and its system of education, which promotes a vile anti-Israeli credo, raise some question marks as to its final objective. In addition, the latest opinion polls conducted in the PA-ruled West Bank show that the overwhelming majority of Palestinian Arabs support the Hamas and the massacres carried out in Israel on 7 October.
Another difference between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the conflict between France and the FLN has to do with geography. The Mediterranean Sea separated between France and Algeria, affording the French a wide margin of security. The mountains of the West Bank overlook the major residential areas of Israel, and Gaza, as we have witnessed, is next door to Israeli civilian centers.
A further impediment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs is the Iranian regime’s strategy to encircle Israel with mortal enemies bent on its destruction. The massacres carried out by Hamas and Islamic Jihad on 7 October are only a morbid hors d’oeuvres of what awaits Israel if Iran and its regional allies had their way. This has already altered the way Israelis delineate their national security parameters: No technological devices can ever replace soldiers on the ground; no international guarantee can ever replace Israel’s security forces. Israel needs defensible borders from which it can defend its civilian population, rather than secure borders, a pale and ambiguous term, often used in international resolutions (see, for instance, UN Security Council Resolution 242, which has become the legal basis for Arab-Israeli peace).
To be sure, the reality of around four hundred and fifty thousand Israelis living in the West Bank does not render any solution of the conflict easier. However, Israel evacuated completely its inhabitants from the Gaza Strip in 2005, and that did not help in bringing a resolution of the conflict any nearer. The Hamas and Islamic Jihad want the Israeli population out of Israel itself. Around 15% of the population in Algeria in 1962 were of French origin. Ultimately, that did not prevent an agreement between France and the FLN. Contrary to the Palestinian-Arab case, the FLN did not want the French population out of France itself.
In a sense, Israelis fear a repetition of the Sudetenland and the international community hope for a repetition of Algeria. Of course, Israel is more resolute than Czechoslovakia was in 1938 and the United States is a more steadfast ally of Israel than Britain and France were of Czechoslovakia in 1938. On the other hand, as already mentioned, contrary to the Palestinian Arabs the FLN had limited objectives rendering possible a resolution of its conflict with France.
The late Israeli Prime Minister and President, Shimon Peres, was once asked, “Where is the Israeli de Gaulle?” His reply was, “Where is the Palestinian de Gaulle?”
Perhaps, in the best of cases, what can be expected to emerge eventually is a scenario in which the conflict is moderated, rather than solved, similarly to what occurred between Egypt and Israel between 1974 and 1977. In the light of the way the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has evolved so far, such a scenario would be like a dream-come-true.
Yoav J. Tenembaum is a lecturer in International Relations at Tel Aviv University, Israel. He holds a doctorate in Modern History from Oxford University and a master’s degree in international relations from Cambridge University. His book, "Historical Perspective and International Relations" has just been published by Troubador in the U.K.
